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CANADA’S AUTHORITY TO PROHIBIT LNG
VESSELS FROM PASSING THROUGH HEAD
HARBOR PASSAGE TO U.S. PORTS
Jon M. Van Dyke*
I. INTRODUCTION 
Three U.S. companies are seeking authorization to build liquid natural
gas (LNG) terminals in eastern Maine on Passamaquoddy Bay, across from
New Brunswick, Canada.  The three companies are: (1) Downeast LNG,
which seeks to develop a terminal at Robbinston, Maine; (2) Quoddy Bay
LLC, which seeks to develop an LNG terminal on Indian tribal land at
Sipayik, Maine; and (3) North East Energy Development Company LLC,
which seeks to develop a terminal on the Saint Croix River (a tributary to
Passamaquoddy Bay) at Red Beach in Calais, Maine.  To deliver the LNG
to any one of these terminals, a 300-meter-long tanker would travel at least
once a week through Head Harbor Passage between the Canadian islands
of Campobello and Deer Island, in Canadian waters, and then would return
back through this same passage.  If all three terminals were to open, an
average of six LNG tanker passages would take place each week through
Head Harbor Passage.  
Canada views Head Harbor Passage as an internal Canadian waterway,
and in 1982 issued regulations limiting the amount of oil that can be
transported through the passage.1  About 120 foreign-flag ships pass
through Head Harbor Passage each year, usually to pick up paper pulp and
other forest products destined for European ports.2   Some U.S. ships have
used this passage in previous years, and, in the past few years, the United
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3. Letter from Michael Wilson, Can. Ambassador to the U.S., to Joseph T. Kelliher,
Chair of U.S. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n (Feb. 14, 2007) (on file with author).
4. Id.
States has sent military vessels through Head Harbor Passage to Fourth of
July celebrations in Eastport, Maine.
The Canadian Government announced on February 14, 2007, that it
would prohibit the “passage of LNG tankers through the environmentally-
sensitive and navigationally-challenging marine and coastal areas of the
sovereign Canadian waters of Head Harbour Passage,” because such
passage would “present risks to the region of southwest New Brunswick
and its inhabitants that the Government of Canada cannot accept.”3
Canada’s Ambassador to the United States, Michael Wilson, expressed this
opposition to LNG passage in a letter written to Joseph T. Kelliher, Chair
of the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).4  This action
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5. Chris Morris, N.B. Minister in Federal Cabinet says Ottawa Considers LNG
Dangerous Cargo, TELEGRAPH-J. (St. John, N.B.), Mar. 31, 2006.
6. 141 HANSARD 53, 39th Parl., 1st Sess., at 1455 (2006) (emphasis added).
7. Morris, supra note 5.
8. Id.
9. Anne Ravana, Canada Opposes LNG Terminals Head Harbour Safety, Environment
at Risk, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Feb. 15, 2007, at A1; Rob Linke, U.S. Oks Pipeline for LNG,
N. B. TELEGRAPH-J. (St. John, N.B.), Feb. 23, 2007, at 8.
10. DOWNEAST LNG, QUESTION & ANSWER BRIEFING 24 (2005).  This paper does not
address the claim regarding the 1909 International Boundary Waters Treaty, because it is
followed months of statements explaining Canada’s concern over the LNG
plans.  On March 31, 2006, New Brunswick’s senior minister in the federal
cabinet stated that the Canadian Government views LNG as dangerous
cargo that can be banned from transport in Canadian waters.5  On
September 26, 2006, Prime Minister Stephen Harper was explicit in con-
firming this view to the House of Commons:
Mr. Speaker, I gather there are some representatives of that project
[Downeast LNG] lobbying around the Hill today, so let me be
absolutely clear. This government believes that the waters of
Passamaquoddy Bay are Canadian waters. We have defended that
position for a long time. We oppose the passage of LNG tanker
traffic through Head Harbour and we will continue to do so.6
Officials of the U.S. companies have asserted that their ships have the
right of innocent passage through the Canadian waters that lead into
Passamaquoddy Bay.  Dean Girdis of Downeast LNG of Washington, D.C.
asserted that the United States would not back down on the issue because
it would set a dangerous international precedent.7  Speaking to the New
Brunswick Telegraph-Journal, Girdis said, “[i]f Canada does not permit
freedom of navigation in this particular site, it puts to risk several other
places in the world where billions and trillions of dollars worth of cargo go
through territorial seas, places like the Taiwan Strait or the Strait of
Bahrain.”8  After the Canadian announcement opposing the passage, Girdis
noted that “the leading Canadian legal maritime expert, Ted McDorman . . .
concluded Head Harbor Passage is, in fact, a territorial sea,” and thus that
vessels have the right of innocent passage through this waterway.9  In a
more formal document explaining its position, Downeast LNG has stated
that “[t]he International Boundary Waters Treaty Act of 1909 between the
U.S. and Canada and the United Nations Conventions of the Law of the
Seas [sic] support the transit of Canadian waters by LNG tankers calling on
a U.S. port (and vice versa).”10
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generally assumed that this treaty relates to the bodies of freshwater that are shared between
Canada and the United States, i.e., the lakes and related rivers.  Treaty between the United
States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters between the United States and
Canada, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448.  The text of the Preliminary Article to
the treaty reads as follows:  
For the purpose of this treaty boundary waters are defined as the waters from main
shore to main shore of the lakes and rivers and connecting waterways, or the portions
thereof, along which the international boundary between the United States and the
Dominion of Canada passes, including all bays, arms, and inlets thereof, but not
including tributary waters which in their natural channels would flow into such lakes,
rivers, and waterways, or waters flowing from such lakes, rivers, and waterways, or
the waters of rivers flowing across the boundary.
Id.  Article I of this treaty contains the following language:
The High Contracting Parties agree that the navigation of all navigable boundary
waters shall forever continue free and open for the purposes of commerce to the
inhabitants and to the ships, vessels, and boats of both countries equally, subject,
however, to any laws and regulations of either country, within its own territory, not
inconsistent with such privilege of free navigation and applying equally and without
discrimination to the inhabitants, ships, vessels, and boats of both countries.
Id. art. I.  If this provision were somehow deemed to be applicable to Head Harbor Passage,
it would permit Canada to apply “laws and regulations,” so long as they are applied in a
nondiscriminatory basis.  A Canadian law restricting vessels above a certain size in certain
locations in order to protect a fragile environmental zone, for instance, would, therefore, be
consistent with this treaty.
11. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 [hereinafter Law of the Sea Convention].  Canada ratified the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea in November 2003, but the United States has not yet ratified
it.  See DIV. FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, UNITED NATIONS, CHRONO-
LOGICAL LISTINGS OF RATIFICATIONS OF, ACCESSIONS AND SUCCESSIONS TO THE CONVEN-
TION AND THE RELATED AGREEMENTS AS AT 07 NOVEMBER 2008 (2008), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications
.htm#The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.  
Those supporting the LNG shipments have argued that the Canadian
position is inconsistent, because it allows LNG shipments to terminals in
New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, and because, in their view, all cargo
ships have a right of innocent passage through Head Harbor Passage
pursuant to customary international law and the 1982 United Nations Law
of the Sea Convention (Law of the Sea Convention).11  An attorney for
Quoddy Bay LLC has written:    
[Greg Thompson, Minister of Veterans Affairs in the Canadian
Cabinet,] asserted his opposition to certain LNG projects (that is,
only those in Maine but not those in New Brunswick or Nova
Scotia) . . . [He] indicated that Canada would stop the passage of
LNG carriers through Head Harbor Passage the same way they
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12. Gordon Grimes, Treaty Trumps LNG Politics, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Mar. 24, 2006,
at A15. 
13. Morton, supra note 2.  
14. DOWNEAST LNG, supra note 10, at 24. 
worked in the 1970's to stop the threat of oil tankers going on a
similar route to the proposed Pittston refinery in Eastport. . . .
Thompson’s statement that Canada can stop ships traveling
through Head Harbor Passage may have overlooked Canada’s
adoption in November 2003 of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea.  This treaty, which now binds Canada, requires
that they give any ship the right of ‘innocent passage’ through that
strait.  Thus foreign vessels of any state must be allowed to pass
from the high seas through Canada’s territorial waters to reach
waters of the United States such as those in Passamaquoddy Bay.
Quoddy Bay can only hope that Canada lives up to its treaty
obligations and applies the same standards to LNG carriers moving
through Head Harbor Passage as it will to those moving through
the Canso Strait to Bear Head and other Canadian waters.12
Another U.S. ocean law expert, Professor Bernard Oxman of the Uni-
versity of Miami, has expressed the opinion that “Ottawa has consistently
taken the somewhat liberal view of how it claims waters for its own.”
Oxman has also stated that “Canada likes to overlook certain parts of the
treaty,” referring to the Law of the Sea Conention.13
II. PASSAMAQUODDY BAY
Passamaquoddy Bay opens into the Bay of Fundy, which is inter-
nationally recognized as an area of rich biological diversity, and is famous
for its dramatic daily tidal action.  At Eastport, Maine, the mean tidal varia-
tion is 18.4 feet and the maximum tidal variation is 20.9 feet.14  The
Quoddy region is a critical breeding area for herring and cod and is a
feeding area for migratory birds and marine mammals, including minke
whales, humpback whales, finback whales, rare North Atlantic right
whales, and harbor porpoises.  This region is also renowned for its out-
standing scenic vistas.
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15. Jeffrey D. Ewen, Comment, The United States and Canada in Passamaquoddy Bay:
Internal Waters and the Right of Passage to a Foreign Port, 4 SYRACUSE J. INT’LL. & COM.
167, 168 (1976) (noting that Passamaquoddy Bay’s “myriad of rocks and islands, its strong
tides, and dense fogs create serious hazards for navigation”).  “There is an average of 60
days of fog and 120 days of precipitation each year, and on 19 days in a typical year the wind
blows at 32 knots or more—too strong for the tugs that would be required to guide the
tankers to and from the open sea.”  Id. at 168-69 n.8 (citing MAINE TIMES, May 4, 1973, at
15).
16. See, e.g., SOC’Y OF INT’L GAS TANKER AND TERMINAL OPERATORS LTD., SITE
SELECTION AND DESIGN FOR LNG PORTS AND JETTIES (1997). 
A. Safety Concerns
The Maine coast adjacent to Passamaquoddy Bay is a particularly
inappropriate location for an LNG terminal because the narrow passages of
suitable depth within the Western Passage of Passamaquoddy Bay and in the
Saint Croix River present the possibility of a collision.  Furthermore, the
coastal populations adjacent to the bay would be put in grave risk should such
an event occur.  Head Harbor Passage is known for strong tidal action, rip
tides, and whirlpools, and is only 1,800 feet wide at its narrowest point.
Three areas within the Canadian waters of Head Harbor Passage have
hazardous rock outcroppings, as do two areas in the Western Passage
between Deer Island and the Maine coast (Clark Ledge and Dog Island).  As
the tide moves in and out, rip tides and whirlpools form, and the current is
difficult to judge.  The Old Sow Whirlpool, one of the world’s largest ocean
whirl hazards, requires transiting ships to hug the Eastport shore, a residential
area near Clark Ledge and Dog Island.  Adding to this hazardous route are
fog and reduced visibility, which are both common and unpredictable.15
The guidelines developed by the Society of International Gas Terminal
and Tanker Operators (SIGTTO) emphasize that terminals should be sited in
sheltered, remote areas where other ships do not pose a risk of collision.16
The risks of collision must be taken very seriously because LNG tankers are
vulnerable to penetration by collision if they come into contact with any
heavy displacement ship going more than the most moderate of speeds.  Ships
passing near to berthed LNG carriers can cause the carrier to surge or range
along the jetty, threatening the moorings, and therefore these jetties should
not be located near channels used by large ships.  Indeed, all nearby traffic
can present ignition risks that pose serious dangers to the gas on the LNG
carriers.  Thus, even pleasure craft and fishing vessels can pose a threat to the
LNG carriers, and enforcement of exclusion zones in other areas has proved
to be difficult.  Under U.S. law, safety and security zones come into effect
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17. 33 C.F.R. § 3.05-10 (2007).
18. DOWNEAST LNG, supra note 10, at 21.
19. Id. at 22.
20. Id. at 23.  
21. See, e.g., RICHARD A. CLARKE, LNG FACILITIES IN URBAN AREAS: A SECURITY RISK
MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS FOR ATTORNEY GENERAL PATRICK LYNCH,RHODE ISLAND 5 (2005)
(explaining that “[b]oth the proposed urban LNG off loading facility and the proposed LNG
tanker transit through 29 miles of Rhode Island have security vulnerabilities that are unlikely
to be successfully remediated”); JAMES A. FAY, PUBLIC SAFETY ISSUES AT THE PROPOSED
PLEASANT POINT LNG TERMINAL 3 (2004) (“FERC’s regulations ignore the greatest risks
of all, that foreign or domestic terrorists could destroy the storage tank primary and second-
ary containment systems, or the LNG tanker cargo hold, allowing LNG to spill unhindered
onto ground or water, where it would most likely burn.”).  In March 2007, the U.S.
Government Accountability Office reported that fire from a terrorism attack against an LNG
tanker “could ignite so fiercely it would burn people one mile away.”  Study: LNG Tanker
Blast Could Burn Victims One Mile Away, N. ADAMS TRANSCRIPT (Mass.), Mar. 15, 2007.
when LNG vessels transit and dock in a harbor in inland waters.17  During
transit, these zones are typically 500 yards (almost one-third of a mile) along
the sides of the vessel, two miles ahead, and one mile behind.18  When the
ship is docked, the security zone can range from one-hundred to 1000 yards.19
At present, some cargo vessels use these waters to travel to the ports of
Eastport, Maine, and Bayside, New Brunswick, and fishing vessels and
pleasure craft are numerous throughout the area.  Downeast LNG has stated
that “[s]ome water-borne activities will be restricted only during ship transit
and offloading, about once a week.  Ship transit from Head Harbor Passage
to the pier is expected to take less than 2 hours, and offloading about 12-14
hours.”20  Potential spills from fully-loaded LNG tankers navigating through
narrow waterways present fire dangers to all those located on the shoreline.
The terminal area also presents significant hazards, including thermal
radiation from fires burning above a liquid spill on the site, combustible
vapors being driven by wind to adjacent areas, and terrorist attacks on the
safety containment systems leading to fires and spillage into ground and
surface water systems.21
B.  The Canadian Reaction to the Proposed Pittston Oil Refinery in
Eastport in the Mid-1970s
The Canadian Government repeatedly voiced its opposition to the
proposal to put an oil refinery in Eastport, which sits at the eastern edge of
Maine, because the oil tankers would have had to proceed through Head
Harbor Passage to get to this location.  A study commissioned by Canada’s
Department of Fisheries and Environment concluded that the tides and
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22. Linke, supra note 9, at 8. 
23. Letter from H.B. Robertson, Under Sec’y of State for External Affairs, to A.F.
Kaulakis, Vice President of the Pittston Co. (Dec. 1, 1976), quoted in, SAVE
PASSAMAQUODDY BAY/CANADA, BRIEFING NOTE:REGULATING A BAN ON LNGTANKERS IN
HEAD HARBOUR PASSAGE (2006), www.saveourbay.ca/files/Prime%20Minister%20-
%20Nov%2016-06.doc.
24. Canada Shipping Act, Regulations Limiting the Quantity of Oil That May Be Carried
on Board Oil Tankers in the Waters Within Head Harbour Passage, New Brunswick
(Shipping Act), SOR/1982-244 (Can).  A report issued by Downeast LNG stated: “We also
understand that the regulations passed in the 1970s restricting the transit of crude oil tankers
through Head Harbor [P]assage to the proposed Piston [sic?] Refinery at Shackford Head
were rescinded by the government.”  DOWNEAST LNG, supra note 10, at 24.  
currents of this region “would make it extremely difficult, and at times
impossible, to [maneuver] and berth very large crude carriers,” and that
Head Harbor Passage had “a high level of navigational risk.”22  On
December 1, 1976, H.B. Robertson, Under Secretary of State for External
Affairs wrote to the Vice President of the Pittston Company explaining that
“the risks inherent in the transport of a large volume of pollutants through
Head Harbour Passage would be unacceptable, . . . that the Government
was therefore opposed to such transport in these difficult waters,” and that
the Canadian Government would not approve or permit oil tankers to transit
Canadian waters to a refinery in Eastport.23  Subsequently, on February 11,
1982, Canada promulgated Oil Carriage Limitation Regulations, pursuant
to the Canada Shipping Act, stating that vessels passing through Head
Harbor Passage could not carry more than 5000 cubic meters of oil.24
III. ARE THE WATERS IN HEAD HARBOR PASSAGE THE “INTERNAL
WATERS” OF CANADA?
A.  The Bay of Fundy Seems to Qualify as a Juridical Bay under Article
10 of the Law of the Sea Convention
The Bay of Fundy is a dramatic body of water known for its fifty-foot
tidal fluctuations.  It extends between Nova Scotia and New Brunswick for
approximately one-hundred miles.  It then branches into two directions fifty
miles through the Minas Channel into Minas Basin and Cobequid Bay in
Nova Scotia, and into the Chignecto Bay between the two provinces.  The
Bay of Fundy is thirty to fifty miles in width for most of the length of its
main body; however, its entrance has small and large islands across it.  This
complicates the determination of the width of the entrance.  Grand Manan
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25. The Canadian Encyclopedia, Grand Manan Island, http://www.thecanadian
encyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=A1SEC821450 (last visited Sept. 25,
2008).
26. G.V. La Forest, Canadian Inland Waters of the Atlantic Provinces and the Bay of
Fundy Incident, 1963 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 149, 164.  Professor Girard Vincent La Forest
subsequently served on the Supreme Court of Canada from 1985 to 1997.
27. Government of New Brunswick, Grand Manan Island—Shipwrecks, http://www.gnb.
ca/cnb/grand/ship-e.asp (last visited Sept. 25, 2008).
28. Ralph Collier, Bird Watching on Canada’s Grand Manan Island, MAIN LINE TIMES
(Montgomery County, Pa.), Oct. 27, 2004, at 7.
29. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 11, art. 10(4) (“If the distance between the
low-water marks of the natural entrance points of a bay does not exceed 24 nautical miles,
a closing line may be drawn between these two low-water marks, and the waters enclosed
thereby shall be considered as internal waters.”).
30. These distances were supplied by Grand Manan fisher Laurence Cook (who took the
measurements off his plotter) to Janice Harvey, Fundy Baykeeper Director, Conservation
Council of New Brunswick, Apr. 25, 2007.  
31. See infra text accompanying note 48.
Island, which has a population of approximately 2500,25 stands dramatically
astride the Bay’s entrance in its northwest sector.  The island is surrounded
by a cluster of smaller islets, including, to the southeast, White Head Island
and Kent Island.  Then, five miles southeast of Kent Island is Old Proprie-
tor’s Shoal or Old Proprietor’s Ledge, a “rock island above sea level at low
tide on which a beacon has been placed.”26  This feature, the site of the
October 25, 1909 crash of the steamship Hestia, which caused the death of
thirty-four crew members,27 is a navigational hazard.  It is also a favorite
spot for groups to visit in search of unusual birds, such as razorbills, max,
soothy and greater shearwaters, Wilson’s and Leach’s storm-petrels, and
poimarine and parasitic jaegers.28  About five miles (eight kilometers) south
of Kent Island is Gannet Rock.  In the southeast corner of the Bay of
Fundy’s front, Digby Neck, Long Island, and Brier Island form the
entrance-headland on the Nova Scotia side.  
The distances across the waters between these island features are less
than twenty-four nautical miles, which is the maximum length allowed for
a closing line of a juridical bay under Article 10(4) of the Law of the Sea
Convention.29  The distance from Old Proprietor’s Ledge to Long Island,
Nova Scotia is 20.236 nautical miles at low tide; the distance from Gannet
Rock to Brier Island  is 23.232 nautical miles at low tide; and the distance
from Black Rock off of the eastern coast of White Head Island to Tiverton,
at the tip of Long Island, is 23.976 nautical miles at low tide.30
Article 10(4) refers to the “natural entrance points of a bay” without
requiring that these points be connected directly to a land mass.31  The
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32. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 127 (Mar. 29, 1950)
(emphasis added).
33. Id. at 127.
34. See also comments made by Professor William Burke in reference to Canada’s claim
that its arctic waters should be considered to be internal waters:  
If it was reasonable for Norway to use a straight baseline system for its coast above
the Arctic circle, where the islands fringe a coast that is sometimes deeply indented,
must if follow that it is unreasonable for Canada to use such a system just because the
islands do not fringe the coast but nonetheless abut that coast in great profusion?
William Burke, The Law of the Sea: Customary Norms and Convention Rules—Remarks,
1987 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 82.
35. Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone art. 7, Apr. 29,
1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
36. See GAYL S. WESTERMAN, THE JURIDICAL BAY 112-13 (1987).
37. Id. at 113.
“natural entrance points” into the Bay of Fundy are certainly the waters
between the features described above, and thus it would appear that the Bay
of Fundy qualifies as a juridical bay under Article 10 of the Law of the Sea
Convention.   
It is logical to consider the location of the islands at the entrance to the
Bay of Fundy in determining whether it qualifies as a juridical bay because
the seminal case that established the right of coastal countries to claim
internal waters—the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case32—explained
that “the large and small islands [along the northern Norwegian coast],
mountainous in character, the islets, rocks and reefs, some always above
water, others emerging only at low tide, are in truth but an extension of the
Norwegian mainland.”33  Certainly the Canadian islands at the mouth of the
Bay of Fundy play that same role in being inextricably linked with the
Canadian mainland.34
The term “natural entrance point” is not further defined in the Law of
the Sea Convention, but it is significant that these words selected for use
in Article 10 of the Convention (and in its predecessor, Article 7 of the
1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone)35
rather than words such as “headlands” or “inter fauces terrae,” which were
used in previous documents and commentary.36  This change was initiated
by the International Law Commission in its 1955 and 1956 draft articles,
which “intended to favor a more functional, descriptive approach to
identify the entrance of an indentation.”37  The change was designed to
broaden the types of features that could be considered as marking the
natural entrance to an indentation, and “it is clear from the second sentence
in paragraph three [of Article 10] and related legislative history that the
drafters envisioned islands as creating natural entrances to an indenta-
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38. Id.
39. Id. at 123-24.  Professor Westerman has confirmed that the International Law Com-
mission intended for the terms “mouth” and “natural entrance point” to be used inter-
changeably.  Id.
40. Id. at 123 (citing Report of the International Law Commission to the General
Assembly, [1955] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 37, U.N. Doc. A/2934).
41. Id. at 124.  An effort by the United Kingdom to add language to the 1956
Commentary of the International Law Commission to say that, “[n]evertheless, islands at the
mouth of a bay cannot be considered as ‘closing’ the bay if the ordinary sea route passes
between them and the coast,” was rejected by a vote of twenty-eight to eighteen with twenty-
two abstentions.  Id. at 125 (citing Report of the International Law Commission to the
General Assembly, [1956] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 269, U.N. Doc. A/3159).  Countries
apparently rejected this proposal because indentations with islands across their entrance “do
not tend to enclose major navigational routes.”  Id. at 126.
42. Id. at 126 n.121 (citing United States v. Maine, 469 U.S. 504 (1985));  see also id.
at 148-49 (quoting Mahler v. Norwich & N.Y. Transp. Co., 35 N.Y. 352, 355 (1866)); id.
at 149 (quoting United States v. Grush, 5 Mason 290, 301 (1829)).  These cases “illustrate
the complete lack of reluctance on the part of early decision makers to recognize island
formations as natural ‘headlands’ of an indentation.”  Id. at 150.  Other examples of bays
defined by outlying islands offered by Professor Westerman include Raritan Bay in New
Jersey, Buzzards Bay in Massachusetts, and Galveston Bay in Texas.  Id. at 150-51.  As
Professor Westerman explains the argument presented by the United States that islands
cannot in themselves form a bay was rejected in United States v. Louisiana. Id. at 156-57
tion.”38  The second sentence in paragraph three of Article 10 uses the term
“mouth” in much the same way that paragraph four uses the term “natural
entrance point,”39 indicating that the presence of islands along the front of
a bay is not relevant to the application of the semi-circle test, used to
determine whether a body of water has sufficient indentation to qualify as
a bay.  
But this terminology also supports the idea that the twenty-four
nautical-mile length across a “natural entrance point” can utilize islands
along the front of the bay.  The 1955 Commentary of the International Law
Commission confirms this point.  It states that because the presence of
islands along the front of a bay links the indentation more closely with the
territory, an indentation without islands at its entrance would not fulfill the
necessary conditions recognized for a bay.40  Professor Westerman has
explained that this language provides “important indication of an intent to
create a special regime for multi-mouthed bays.”41
Westerman has also explained that the presence of fronting islands
serves to give Biscayne Bay (opposite and south of Miami) “its status as
internal waters,” and that Long Island and Block Island serve to create “a
juridical bay comprised of Long Island Sound and portions of Block Island
Sound.”42  “One may scarcely ignore a geographical feature which has been
56 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:1
(referencing 394 U.S. 11, 62 n.83 (1969)).
43. Id. at 127.
44. Id. at 131.
45. Id. at 132.
46. Id. at 135 (referring to an amendment proposed by Mr. Sandstrom).
47. Id. at 136.
48. Jonathan I. Charney, Central East Asian Maritime Boundaries and the Law of the
Sea, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 724, 737 (1995) (“Canada claims the Bay of Fundy adjacent to the
Gulf of Maine as a historic bay.”); Donald M. McRae, Canada and the Delimitation of
Maritime Boundaries, in CANADIAN OCEANS POLICY: NATIONAL STRATEGIES AND THE NEW
LAW OF THE SEA 145, 145 n.6 (Donald McRae & Gordon Munro eds.,1989) (explaining that
Canada claims the historic waters regime applies to the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the Bay of
Fundy, Hecate Strait, and Queen Charlotte Sound).  
Claims to “historic bays” and “historic waters” must be based on (1) the exercise of
authority over the area, (2) the continuity over time of this exercise of authority, and (3) the
attitude of foreign states to the claim.  Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including
Historic Bays, [1962] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 1, 19, U.N. Doc. A/CN/4/143.  
expressly given such profound juridical significance.”43  She goes on to
emphasize that:
The presence of islands which create multiple entrances to an
indentation triggers a certain relaxation in the geographical and
mathematical requirements of paragraph two [of Article 10 of the
Law of the Sea Convention], even to the extent that an indentation
which without such islands would fail to meet the ‘necessary
conditions’ is nonetheless to be recognized as a juridical bay.44
For these reasons, “when islands form separate mouths or entrances to
an indentation, the natural entrance points no longer lie solely on the
mainland but at the land terminus of each entrance, however numerous
these entrances may be due to the presence of the islands.”45  An attempt
during the 1955 debates of the International Law Commission to impose a
maximum of twenty-five nautical miles on the “sum total of the various
closing lines drawn connecting the islands and the mainland”46 received “no
support whatever.”47
B.  The Bay of Fundy Can Also Be Considered a “Historic Bay”
For decades, the Canadian Government has claimed the waters of the
Bay of Fundy and its adjacent waters as “historic waters,”48 and therefore
as “internal waters.”  In Canada’s Oceans Act, this claim is reaffirmed in
general terms: “In respect of any area not referred to in subsection (2), the
baselines are the outer limits of any area, other than the territorial sea of
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49. Canada Oceans Act, 1996 S.C., ch. 31, sec. 5 (Can.).  Canada has published its claims
of straight baselines for a number of its coastal areas, including coastal areas in Labrador,
southeast and east Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Vancouver Island, Queen Charlotte Islands,
but it has not yet done so for the waters of the Bay of Fundy and of the Passamaquoddy Bay
region.  See id.; Territorial Sea Geographical Coordinates Order (Oceans Act), 1997 C.R.C.,
ch. 1550.
When explaining the Canada Oceans Act during parliamentary debates, Minister of
Fisheries and Oceans Brian Tobin explained that the “legislation incorporates all relevant
existing law that Canada has, of course covering our full rights and jurisdiction over Internal
Waters, our fishing zones off the Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic coasts, including the Gulf of
St. Lawrence, the Bay of Fundy and Queen Charlotte Sound, Hecate Strait and Dixon
Entrance, and our rights with respect to the Continental Shelf.”  Brian Tobin, Notes for an
Address: The Canada Oceans Act (Sept. 26, 1995).
50. See, e.g., Message from the President of the United States and Commentary Accom-
panying the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Agreement Relating
to the Implementation of the Part XI Upon Their Transmittal to the United States Senate for
Its Advice and Consent, 7 GEO. INT’LENVTL. L. REV. 77, 100-01 (1994) (“Subject to ancient
customs regarding the entry of ships in danger or distress (force majeure) and the exception
noted below, the Convention does not limit the right of the coastal State to restrict entry into
or transit through its internal waters, port entry, imports or immigration.”).  The exception
stated is in Article 8(2) of the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, which states:
“Where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with the method set forth in
article 7 has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which had not previously been
considered as such, a right of innocent passage as provided in this Convention shall exist in
those waters.”  Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 11, art. 8(2).  This provision would
not apply to the waters of the Bay of Fundy and Head Harbor Passage, because Canada has
long considered these waters to be “internal” and did issue regulations in 1982 governing
shipments through Head Harbor Passage.  See Canada Shipping Act, Regulations Limiting
the Quantity of Oil That May Be Carried on Board Oil Tankers in the Waters Within Head
Harbour Passage, New Brunswick (Shipping Act), SOR/1982-244. 
51. La Forest, supra note 26, at 150 (describing the many instances in the nineteenth
century when the Canadian claim to control of the waters of the Bay of Fundy was
articulated (by Great Britain on behalf of Canada) and was respected by other countries). 
Canada, over which Canada has a historic or other title of sovereignty.”49
Ships of other nations have no rights of passage through internal
waters.50
Canada has repeatedly put forward the position that the waters of the
Bay of Fundy are its “internal waters,” and other countries appear to
respect that claim.  In 1962, for instance, after Soviet fishing vessels
entered the bay, Canada told the ambassador of the Soviet Union that the
waters in the Bay of Fundy were Canadian national waters, “and it would
appear that the U.S.S.R. has now agreed to respect” the Canadian
position.51  Some commentators have accepted the proposition that the Bay
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52. See, e.g., JAMES C. F. WANG, HANDBOOK ON OCEAN POLITICS & LAW 9 (1992)
(referring to the Bay of Fundy as an example of a “historic bay”); DONAT PHARAND,
CANADA’SARCTIC WATERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 111(1988) (including the Bay of Fundy
in the list of Canadian bodies of water that “are or may be . . . considered” to be internal
waters “on the basis of geography or history, or both”).
53. The Bay of Fundy is not found on the list of historic waters claims that the United
States has opposed.  J.ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH, UNITED STATES RESPONSES TO
EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS 33-34 (2d ed. 1996).
54. This decision is reproduced in 4 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 4344
(1898).
55. Umpire Bates wrote:
The Bay of Fundy is from 65 to 75 miles wide and 130 to 140 miles long.  It has
several bays on its coasts.  Thus the word bay, as applied to this great body of water,
has the same meaning as that applied to the Bay of Biscay, the Bay of Bengal, over
which no nation can have right to assume sovereignty.  One of the large headlands of
the Bay of Fundy is in the United States, and ships bound to Passamaquoddy must
sail through a large space of it.  The islands of Grand Menan (British) and Little
Menan (American) are situated nearly on a line from headland to headland.  These
islands, as represented in all geographies, are situated in the Atlantic Ocean.  The
conclusion is, therefore, in my mind irresistible that the Bay of Fundy is not a British
bay, nor a bay within the meaning of the word as used in the treaties of 1783 and
1818.
The Washington Arbitration Agreement, U.S.-U.K., at 184, Feb. 8, 1853,S.EXEC.DOC. 103
(1853), quoted in, MOORE, supra note 54, at 4344; Mohamed El Baradei, The Egyptian-
Israeli Peace Treaty and Access to the Gulf of Aqaba: A New Legal Regime, 76 AM. J. INT’L
L. 532, 537 (1982). 
of Fundy is a “historic bay” without question,52 and the United States has
not formally objected to this position in recent years.53
In 1856, when Great Britain exercised sovereignty over Canada, the
status of the Bay of Fundy was addressed by Umpire Bates in The
Washington arbitral award, a decision rendered pursuant to the Anglo-
American Claims Convention of 1853.54  His conclusion was that the Bay
of Fundy could not be viewed as an exclusively British bay, and therefore
U.S. ships were allowed to fish in the waters of the bay outside the
territorial sea (which was then three nautical miles).55  Nevertheless, this
decision is not applicable to the present controversy, both because the law
has changed in important respects, and because the decision was based on
erroneous assumptions.  In 1856, the territorial sea extended only three
nautical miles from the coasts of Canada and the United States, whereas
now it extends to twelve nautical miles.  This change has resulted in the
entrance to the Bay of Fundy being completely covered by Canadian
territorial waters.  In addition, Bates’ decision rested, in part, on the view
that “[o]ne of the headlands of the Bay of Fundy is in the United States.”
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56. La Forest characterized the ruling by Umpire Bates in The Washington arbitration as
“wrong,” and noted that Bates “was not a lawyer.”  La Forest, supra note 26, at 162.
57. Zou Keyuan, Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin, 30 OCEAN DEV.
& INT’L LAW 235, 241 (1999).
58. Bohai Bay is not found in the list of historic waters claims that the United States has
opposed. ROACH & SMITH, supra note 53, at 33.
59. Zou Keyuan, supra note 57, at 241.
60. Hudson Bay is about 900 miles in length, with a maximum width of 520 miles.
James Michael Zimmerman, The Doctrine of Historic Bays: Applying an Anachronism in
the Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 763, 773 n.64 (1986).
It embraces 580,000 square miles.  YAHUDA Z. BLUM, HISTORIC TITLES IN INTERNATIONAL
Nevertheless, as explained above, it seems more logical to draw the closing
lines across the bay from the southernmost point of the New Brunswick
coast (at St. Andrews) to Campobello, Grand Manan Island, White Head
Island, Gannet Rock, and then to Brier Island in Nova Scotia.  Bates
described the Bay of Fundy as being from sixty-five to seventy-five miles
wide, but the distance between the small islands southeast of Grand Manan
Island and the islands extending southwest from Digby, Nova Scotia is less
than the twenty-four nautical miles required to characterize the Bay of
Fundy as a proper juridical bay under Article 10(4) of the Law of the Sea
Convention.  Therefore, this 1856 ruling does not appear to be based on
sound principles of international law in light of the evolution of the
principles governing the law of the sea,56 and Canada has continued to view
the waters of the Fundy region as internal waters.  
The bay that seems most comparable to the Bay of Fundy is the Bohai
Bay on China’s northeast coast, near Korea.  Bohai is a very large bay, with
an entrance of forty-five nautical miles across from the coastal headlands,
but (like the Bay of Fundy) with a chain of small islands extending across
its opening.  The largest distance between the islands that extend across the
Bohai is 22.5 nautical miles.57  China has long claimed the waters in Bohai
Bay as internal waters, and no other country seems to have formally
objected to this claim.58  One prominent Chinese scholar has explained that
China has justified its claim to Bohai Bay as internal waters: 
by saying that Bohai Bay was completely inside the strait baseline
of China’s territorial sea; the breadth of the largest entrance along
the closing line of the bay was 22.5 nautical miles, less than 24
nautical miles; and for thousands of years it has been constantly
under the actual jurisdiction of China.59
Another comparable bay is Canada’s Hudson Bay.  This enormous
bay60 connects with the Atlantic Ocean through the Hudson Strait, which
60 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:1
LAW 266 (1965).
61. Id.
62. V. Kenneth Johnston, Canada’s Title to Hudson Bay and Hudson Strait, 1934 BRIT.
Y.B. INT’LL. 1, 20.  Canada adopted legislation in 1906 requiring whalers to obtain licenses
when hunting whales in Hudson Bay.  PHARAND, supra note 52, at 169; Act to Amend the
Fisheries Act, 1906, 6 Edw. VII, ch. 13 (Can.).  In 1907, Sir Richard Cartwright stated in
the Canadian Senate that “Canada has a very reasonably good ground to regard Hudson Bay
as a mare clausum and as belonging to it, that everything there may be considered as
pertaining thereto.” Id. at 10 (quoting Canadian Senate Debates, Feb. 20, 1907, at 266).  In
December 1973, an official of the Canadian Department of External Affairs stated that
Canada claimed Hudson Bay and Hudson Strait as historic internal waters, quoting from a
statement made to the House of Commons in 1957 by the Minister of Northern Affairs that
“the waters of Hudson Bay are Canadian waters by historic title” and that Canada regarded
“as inland waters all the waters west of a line drawn across the entrance to Hudson Strait
from Button Island to Hatton Head on Resolution Island.”  Id. at 112 (quoting Edward G.
Lee, Canadian Practice in International Law during 1973 as Reflected Mainly in Public
Correspondence and Statements of the Department of External Affairs, 12 CAN. Y.B. INT’L
L. 272, 279 (1974)).
63. See, e.g., WANG, supra note 52, at 9.  The United States has long opposed Canada’s
claim that Hudson Bay is internal Canadian waters.  ROACH & SMITH, supra note 53, at 33.
64. PHARAND, supra note 52, at 129 n.92.
65. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 11, art. 7(1).
is said by one scholar to have an entrance of fifty miles,61 and also has
many large and small islands across it.  Canada has long claimed Hudson
Bay as internal waters “[o]n the basis of occupation, and acquiescence by
other states in that occupation,”62 and this claim has been accepted as valid
by many commentators.63  Canada drew a baseline across the Hudson Strait
as early as 1937.64
Canada may also be able to take the position that it is entitled to draw
straight baselines, under Article 7 of the Law of the Sea Convention,
connecting Brier Island in Nova Scotia to Gannet Rock, and further to
Grand Manan Island, Campobello Island, Deer Island in Passamaquoddy
Bay, and finally St. Andrews on the New Brunswick mainland.  Such a
configuration would completely enclose the Bay of Fundy and
Passamaquoddy Bay, and establish them both clearly as internal waters.
Paragraph 1 of Article 7 allows straight baselines to be drawn under the
following circumstances:  
In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or
if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate
vicinity, the method of straight baselines joining appropriate points
may be employed in drawing the baseline from which the breadth
of the territorial sea is measured.65
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66. See, e.g., J. Peter A. Bernhardt, Straightjacketing Straight Baselines, in
INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION: ROCKS AND SHOALS AHEAD? 85 (Jon M. Van Dyke, Lewis
M. Alexander & Joseph R. Morgan eds., 1988).
67. Id. at 89.  This proposal also suggested a requirement that “at least 50% of the
coastline be masked by fringing islands from the vantage point of the mariner at sea,” but
this part of the proposal has not met with international acceptance and certainly is not
supported by state practice.  Id. at 92.
68. Ewen, supra note 15, at 170.
69. Id.
70. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 11, art. 10(1) (“This article relates only to
bays the coasts of which belong to a single State.”); see also L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 508 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed.1955) (“[A]ll gulfs and bays enclosed by the land of
more than one littoral State, however narrow their entrance may be, are non-territorial.”).
71. Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hon.; Nicar. intervening) 1992
I.C.J. 351, (Sept. 11, 1992).
72. Agreement between Sri Lanka and India on the Boundary in Historic Waters between
the Two Countries and Related Matters, Sri Lanka-India, June 26 & 28, 1974, available at
http://www.un.org/Dept/los/legislationandtreaties/PDFFILES/Treaties/LKA-
IND1976MB.pdf.
Certainly the Bay of Fundy and the Passamaquoddy Bay constitute
deep indentations, and the indentations continue from Fundy into the
Chignecto Bay and the Minas Basin and Cobequid Bay.  The depth of the
indentations and the length of the individual baselines meet the criteria
proposed by U.S. officials, who were writing in the 1980s to limit baseline
claims,66 allowing baselines of up to forty-five nautical miles.67  Under this
approach, it would not be necessary to establish separately the status of the
Bay of Fundy as either a juridical or historical bay.  
C.  What Is the Status of the Waters of Passamaquoddy Bay?
Passamaquoddy Bay has an entrance of about thirteen nautical miles,
even without considering the islands across its entrance, and thus it would
certainly be viewed as a juridical bay if it were solely within a single
country.68  As such, its waters would be viewed as internal waters.69
Normally, bays that are divided between two or more countries do not qualify
as juridical bays under international law,70 but a number of exceptions to that
rule have been recognized.  The International Court of Justice characterized
the Gulf of Fonseca as a juridical bay, even though it is bordered by
Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador.71  Other examples include the Sea of
Azov, which is now viewed as internal waters jointly shared by Russia and
Ukraine, and the Palk Strait, which is viewed as internal waters shared by
India and Sri Lanka.72  At least one author has concluded that it would be
logical to view Passamaquoddy Bay as internal waters shared by the United
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73. Ewen, supra note 15, at 171.
74. Message from the President of the United States and Commentary Accompanying the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Agreement Relating to the
Implementation of the Part XI Upon Their Transmittal to the United States Senate for its
Advice and Consent, 7 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 77, 106 (1994) (“These so-called “dead-
end” straits include Head Harbor Passage leading through Canadian territorial sea to the
United States’ Passamaquoddy Bay.”); Michel Bourbonniere & Louis Haeck, Military Air-
craft and International Law: Chicago Opus 3, 66 J. AIR L. & COM. 885, 961 n.285 (2001).
75. Lois E. Fielding, Maritime Interception: Centerpiece of Economic Sanctions in the
New World Order, 53 LA. L. REV. 1191, 1226 n.194 (1993).  This regime would also govern
travel through the Gulf of Finland into St. Petersburg if Finland and Estonia were to expand
their territorial seas from three to twelve nautical miles, and through the Aegean Sea into the
Turkish port of Izmir if Greece were to expand its territorial sea claim from six to twelve
nautical miles in that region.  See, e.g., George P. Politakis, The Aegean Dispute in the
1990s: Naval Aspects of the New Law of the Sea Convention, in GREECE AND THE LAW OF
THE SEA 291, 295, 302 (Theodore C. Kariotis ed., 1997); see also George P. Politakis, The
States and Canada.73  Even if this view were not accepted, Canada can draw
a baseline connecting Campobello Island to Deer Island and then Deer Island
to St. Andrews on the New Brunswick mainland, thus making most of
Passamaquoddy Bay internal waters of Canada.
D.  What Is the Status of the Head Harbor Passage 
Under International Law?
Head Harbor Passage is certainly a “strait” as that term is understood
by geographers, but it is not a strait governed by the transit passage regime
created by the Law of the Sea Convention.  That regime applies only to
“straits which are used for international navigation between one part of the
high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas
or an exclusive economic zone,” and hence it does not by its terms apply
to Head Harbor Passage, which connects the internal waters of Canada to
the territorial sea (or internal waters) of the United States.
Some commentators have said that Head Harbor Passage is governed
by Article 45(1)(b) of the Law of the Sea Convention, which addresses
passage between “a part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and
the territorial sea of a foreign State,” and states that the regime of nonsus-
pendable innocent passage applies to such waterways.74  These straits are
sometimes called “dead-end straits.”  Among the other waterways usually
thought to be governed by Article 45(1)(b) are the Strait of Tiran (leading
into the Gulf of Aqaba and the Israeli port of Elat); the Bahrain-Saudi
Arabia Passage; the Strait of Georgia (leading through Canadian waters
into the Seattle area); and the Gulf of Honduras (leading to Guatemala).75
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Aegean Agenda: Greek National Interests and the New Law of the Sea Convention, 10 INT’L
J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 497 (1995).
76. See generally Jon M. Van Dyke, The Disappearing Right to Navigational Freedom
in the Exclusive Economic Zone, 29 MARINE POL’Y 107, 107-21 (2005); Duncan E.J. Currie
& Jon M. Van Dyke, Recent Developments in the International Law Governing Shipments
of Nuclear Materials and Wastes and their Implications for SIDS, 14 RECIEL 117 (2005)
[hereinafter Van Dyke, The Disappearing Right]; Jon M. Van Dyke, Balancing Navigational
Freedom with Environmental and Security Concerns, 14 COLO. J. INT’LENVTL. L. & POL’Y
2003 YEARBOOK 19 (2004).
77. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 11, art. 56; see DAVID JOSEPH ATTARD, THE
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 43 (1987).
78. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 11, art. 58(1). 
79. Id. art. 58(3). 
80. See ATTARD, supra note 77, at 94.
81. Donald R. Rothwell, Navigational Rights and Freedoms in the Asia Pacific
Following Entry into Force of the Law of the Sea Convention, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 587, 619
(1995). One of the most potent provisions in favor of coastal state authority is Article
220(3)(6) of the Law of the Sea Convention, which authorizes coastal states to obtain the
identification of and to conduct a search of commercial cargo vessels in its EEZ that are
suspected of violating the pollution regulations of the coastal state.  Law of the Sea
Convention, supra note 11, art. 220(3)(6).  Under Article 220(3)(6), if “clear grounds” exist
If, however, the waters in Head Harbor Passage are the internal waters of
Canada, as explained above, then Article 45(1)(b) would not apply to this
strait, and it would be subject to the complete sovereign control of Canada.
IV. CAN COASTAL COUNTRIES PROHIBIT OR REGULATE THE 
PASSAGE OF SHIPS IN COASTAL WATERS BASED ON THE 
NATURE OF THE CARGO OR THE TYPE OF SHIP?76
Article 58 of the Law of the Sea Convention states that “all States”
enjoy the high-seas freedoms of navigation and overflight in the exclusive
economic zones (EEZs) of other states, but also states that these freedoms
should be exercised with “due regard” to the right of the coastal state to
exploit the resources of the EEZ and the responsibilities of the coastal state
to protect the marine environment, which are spelled out in Article 56.77
Rights of navigation are qualified “subject to the relevant provisions of this
Convention,”78 and maritime states are directed to “have due regard to the
rights and duties of the coastal State” and to “comply with the laws and
regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the provisions
of this Convention and other rules of international law in so far as they are
not incompatible with this Part.”79  Coastal states have been active in
exploiting these resources and seeking a reduction in pollution,80 while also
placing limitations upon navigational rights when necessary to protect their
resources and the marine environment.81
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for believing that a vessel is violating international pollution standards, a coastal state may:
demand information from; physically inspect (if a “substantial discharge” causes or threatens
“significant pollution of the marine environment”); and detain the vessel (if the discharge
causes or threatens damage to the coastline or resources).  Id.
82. Van Dyke, The Disappearing Right, supra note 77, at 109.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Emma Daly, After Oil Spill, Spain and France Impose Strict Tanker
Inspections, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2002, at A5.  Earlier, France had banned vessels over
1600 tons from coming within seven nautical miles of the coast around Cherbourg and Brest,
to protect the fragile coastal environment.  Robert Nadelson, After MOX: The Contemporary
Shipment of Radioactive Substances in the Law of the Sea, 15 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL
L..193, 224 n.189 (2000) (citing Joint Prefectorial Decree 326 Cherbourg/18/81 Brest of
May 13, 1981).
85. Interview with Kristina Gjerde, High Seas Policy Advisor, World Conservation
Union, in Paris, Fr. (Nov. 12, 2003).
86. Van Dyke, The Disappearing Right, supra note 76, at 110.
When future histories of navigational rights are written, the disastrous
breakup of the oil tanker Prestige off the coast of Spain in November 2002
will certainly be identified as one of the defining moments that changed
perceptions and the governing principles of international law.  When this
aged single-hulled tanker started foundering and leaking its oil cargo, Spain
refused to permit the crippled vessel to come into a Spanish port for “safe
haven.”82  After the tanker was towed into the open ocean, it broke apart
causing a dramatic and destructive spill of its cargo.83  Huge amounts of oil
washed up along the beautiful and resource-rich coasts of Spain, Portugal,
and France.  Subsequently, France and Spain issued a decree that stated:
A.  All oil tankers traveling through these two countries’ EEZs
will have to provide advance notice to the coastal
countries about their cargo, destination, flag, and
operators.
B.  All single-hulled tankers more than fifteen years old
traveling through the EEZs of Spain and France will be
subject to spot inspections by coastal maritime authorities
while in the adjacent EEZs and will be expelled from the
EEZs if they are determined, after inspection, to be not
seaworthy.84
Shortly after the Spanish-French decree, Portugal announced that it
would take the same position on this issue.85  In addition, Morocco
announced that single-hulled oil tankers more than fifteen years old
carrying heavy fuel, tar, asphaltic bitumen or heavy crude oil would be
subject to the requirement that they provide prior notification and adhere
to strict safety regulations.86
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87. Marlise Simons, France Clamps Down on Shipping Pollution, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7,
2003, at A8.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Interview with Kristina Gjerde, supra note 85.
91. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Summary of Decisions, at 16, IMO Doc. C93/D (Nov.22,
2004).
92. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Mandatory Shipping Reporting Systems, IMO Res.
MSC.190(79) (Dec. 6, 2004).  WETREP requires oil tankers of more than 600 tons of
deadweight to provide regular reports on their routing and cargo to adjacent coastal states.
Id. 
93. Rachel Cantry, The Coast Guard and Environmental Protection, 52 NAVAL WAR
COLLEGE REV. 77 (1999).
94. Id. at 78.
In spring 2003, the European Union banned large, single-hulled tankers
carrying heavy grade oil from coming into any European ports.87  Similarly,
on April 3, 2003, the French National Assembly unanimously adopted a
new law asserting the right to intercept ships that release polluting ballast
waters as far as ninety miles from its Mediterranean coast, and also
imposed stricter controls on transient oil tankers.88  Captains of vessels
violating these new French laws can be sentenced to up to four years in
prison and fined up to $600,000.89  During this time, Spain, France, and
Portugal were joined by Belgium and the United Kingdom in submitting a
petition to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to declare
virtually their entire EEZs to be “particularly sensitive sea areas,” which
would make them completely off-limits for single-hulled oil tankers and
other cargo vessels transporting dangerous cargoes.90  Acting upon the
recommendation of its Marine Environmental Protection Committee
(MEPC), the IMO Council granted this request in October 2004,91 and then
established the West European Tanker Reporting System (WETREP),
which had the effect of superceding the initiative of the European states
prohibiting single-hulled tankers altogether.92  This sequence of events,
initiated by five maritime countries to protect their own coastal resources,
is a significant example of the “state practice” of restricting navigational
freedom in order to protect the resources of the EEZ. 
Another significant example is the United States’ proposal, which was
approved by the IMO in December 1998, established a mandatory ship
reporting system off the northeast and southeast coasts of the United States
in order to protect the northern right whale from being hit by ships.93  This
whale species was hunted almost to extinction because of its oil, and is now
thought to be the rarest whale species in the world.94  This latest area to
require ship reporting joined nine others that have been establishing by the
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95. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Mandatory Shipping Reporting Systems, IMO Res.
MSC.52(66) (May 30, 1996).  Ushant (Ouessant in French), is the most westerly of the
islands off the coast of France, about fourteen miles from the coast of Finistre.  Id.  Ushant
is about 3850 acres in extent and almost entirely granitic, with steep and rugged coasts
accessible only at a few points, and rendered more dangerous by the frequency of fogs.  Id.
It has a small population of pilots, fishers, and farmers.  Id.
96. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Mandatory Shipping Reporting Systems, IMO Res.
MSC.63(61) (Dec. 3, 1996).
97. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Mandatory Shipping Reporting Systems, IMO Res.
MSC.73(69) (May 19, 1998).
98. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Mandatory Shipping Reporting Systems, IMO Res.
MSC.85(70) (Dec. 7, 1998).
99. Cantry, supra note 93, at 82 (quoting Memorandum from Rear Admiral John Hutson,
(Feb. 18. 1998)).
100. Id. at 85.
IMO to protect fragile environmental areas.  In May 1996, the IMO
approved a reporting regime for the Torres Strait region between Australia
and Papua New Guinea and the inner route of Australia’s Great Barrier
Reef, as well as the area adjacent to France’s Ushant islet.95  Six months
later, the IMO gave this status to Denmark’s Great Belt Traffic Area, the
Strait of Gibraltar, and the area off Finisterre on the Spanish coast.96  On
May 29, 1998, the IMO similarly required that notice be provided by ships
passing through the Strait of Bonifacio between Corsica, France and
Sardinia, Italy and also through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.97  On
December 3, 1998, the IMO imposed this requirement on ships passing
through the Strait of Dover/Pas de Calais as well as those going through the
northeastern and southeastern United States, as described above, to protect
the remaining right whales.98
The U.S. Department of Defense vigorously opposed the designation
of the eastern coastal areas of the United States as mandatory ship reporting
areas.  The Department “‘was concerned that although public ships—
notably warships—were exempt under the NOAA proposal, to require
civilian vessels to report would make it possible to determine (by elimina-
tion) which ships were military,”’ and thereby “‘‘would erode navigational
freedoms globally and endanger American lives.’”’99  Nevertheless, the
U.S. Coast Guard supported this initiative, because of its mandate to
enforce U.S. environmental laws, even though it recognized that this move
might require the United States to support similar initiatives by other
countries, and might lead to the perception that “international law
increasingly recognizes environmental protection as a justifiable reason to
curtail freedom of navigation.”100
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In 2006, Australia established a regime of compulsory pilotage for
ships passing through the Torres Strait, between Australia and Papua New
Guinea.101  This strait is shallow and hazardous, and contains rich fishing
grounds and fragile environmental resources.  The IMO has recommended
that countries comply with this requirement.102  Another example of
restrictions on navigation to protect fragile coastal areas is the establish-
ment by the United States of the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands Marine
National Monument in the waters around the small islands that extend 1400
miles northwest of the main Hawaiian Islands, and the establishment of
“Areas to Be Avoided” by vessels of more than 1000 gross tons within 50
nautical miles of the islands and atolls in this monument.103
V. THE TRANSPORT OF ULTRAHAZARDOUS NUCLEAR MATERIALS104
Numerous states have declared that the shipments of ultrahazardous
nuclear cargoes should not transit through their EEZs.  For instance, in
1992, South Africa and Portugal explicitly requested that Japan’s shipment
of reprocessed nuclear wastes stay out of their EEZs,105 and in response to
an inquiry from Australia, Japan stated that “in principle” the ship would
stay outside the 200-nautical-mile zone of all nations.106  In 1995, Brazil,
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Carol Stimson eds., 1989).
111. Nuclear Safety Law No. 18.302, art. 4 (1984), amended by Law 19.825 (2002)
(Chile).
Argentina, Chile, South Africa, Nauru, and Kiribati all expressly banned
the British nuclear cargo ship Pacific Pintail from their EEZs and Chile
sent its ships and aircraft to force the ship out of its EEZ.107  In 1999, New
Zealand issued a strong statement protesting these shipments, stating that
they should not be permitted through New Zealand’s EEZ because of the
“‘‘precautionary principle’ enshrined in the Rio Declaration.”’108  Several
states have filed declarations under Article 310 of the Law of the Sea
Convention explaining that Articles 22 and 23 of the Convention presume
the existence of international conventions regulating transport of nuclear
materials and that, until such treaties are developed, coastal states can require
prior notification, or even prior authorization, for such shipments adjacent to
their coasts.109  Even Japan has stated that vessels carrying nuclear weapons
do not have the right to transit through Japan’s territorial sea.110
In October 2002, Chile modified its “Law for Nuclear Safety” to
require prior authorization for any transport of “nuclear substances” and
“radioactive materials” through Chile’s EEZ.111  Such authorization will be
granted only if the transporter establishes that the shipment will “keep[] the
environment free of contamination,” and only after information has been
provided regarding the date and route of the shipment, the “characteristics
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html.
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scenic/weather/Antartic_weather3htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2008).
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116. Id.  “‘Although we recognize that advance notification of coastal states is not
required, we consider it to be an important element in preparation for contingencies,’ Robert
A. McGuire, the [U.S. Department of Transportation] associate administrator for hazardous
materials, wrote in an Oct. 17[, 2003] letter.  ‘It may be necessary to seek shelter in waters
of the load,” and the “safety and contingency measures” that are being
utilized.112
A.  The San Onofre Nuclear Reactor
Another defining moment in the tension between navigational freedom
and the right of coastal states to restrict the movement of ships through the
waters adjacent to their coasts based on the nature of the ship and its cargo
was the United States’ announcement on February 3, 2004 that it was
abandoning its plan to ship the 770-ton, decommissioned nuclear reactor
from the San Onofre nuclear plant in Southern California around Cape
Horn at the southern tip of South America to South Carolina for burial.113
This plan, which had previously been approved by the U.S. Department of
Transportation despite conflicting views within the U.S. government, was
to put the reactor on a barge that would make a ninety-day journey around
South America.  This journey would thus include the transiting of Drake’s
Passage at the continent’s tip, which is one of the world’s most dangerous
nautical passages, as gale-force winds blow there 200 days each year.114
Although logic would have favored burial in California or Hanford,
Washington, or transporting the reactor across the United States by train,
these options were rejected because of U.S. laws governing the disposal of
nuclear wastes and because of liability concerns.
The U.S. State Department originally instructed Southern California
Edison that it “should not apply for Chilean authorization for the passage
because it was concerned that [Southern California Edison’s] doing so
would set an unfavorable precedent for future shipments.”115  Subsequently,
however, the U.S. Department of Transportation indicated that it thought
consultations with Chile would be logical because of the potential risks and
the advantages of having emergency contingency plans.116  The Department
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of Transportation also urged Southern California Edison to develop more
realistic salvage plans in the case of a sinking.117
These concerns seemed to resonate with the State Department because
a month later, in late November, the State Department said that “a number
of significant issues” needed to be resolved before the reactor could be
shipped, and stated specifically that Southern California Edison should
consider another route around South America, explain in detail its salvage
contingency plans, and show it has adequate liability insurance.118
However, the Department of Transportation finally issued a permit for the
shipment on December 1, 2003.119  Southern California Edison stated that
“the ocean journey will be made in international shipping lanes hundreds
of miles off the coasts of Central and South America.  The journey around
Cape Horn will have to be completed before the beginning of the region’s
winter storms, typically by April.”120  It was never clear whether the vessel
was going to try to avoid passing through Chile’s EEZ altogether by staying
more than 200 nautical miles from the Chilean coast.  A second inter-
national hurdle was presented by a January 2004 court decision in
Argentina, which prohibited the passage of the reactor through Argentina’s
EEZ.121  This decision issued by Argentine federal judge Jorge Pfleger cited
the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal122 as authorizing coastal countries to
block such shipments.123  After this decision, Argentine officials stated that
if the shipment passed through Argentina’s EEZ “the load will be inter-
cepted by the military and escorted out of the nation’s territorial waters.”124
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Affairs, Philippines; Moritaka Hayashi, Waseda University, Japan; Ji Guoxing, Shanghai
Jiao Tong University, China; Commander Kim Duk-ki, National Security Council, Republic
of Korea; Pham Hao, Deputy Director General, Department of International Law and
Treaties, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vietnam; Shigeki Sakamoto, Kobe University, Japan;
Rear Admiral (Ret.) O.P. Sharma, College of Naval Warfare, Mumbai, India; Alexander S.
Skaridov, Russian State Humanitarian University, St. Petersburg, Russia; Mark J. Valencia,
Maritime Policy Analyst, Kaneohe, Hawaii, USA; Jon M. Van Dyke, University of Hawaii,
USA; and Judge Alexander Yankov, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Hamburg,
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This important decision would have set the stage for a significant inter-
national incident had the shipment taken place and transited within 200
nautical miles of Argentina’s coast.  The subsequent U.S. decision to
abandon this shipment must therefore be viewed as a recognition that
coastal countries have the authority to take action to protect their coastal
populations and resources, even if such actions impose limits on navigation.
B.  EEZ Group 21
Under the auspices of Japan’s Ocean Policy Research Foundation, with
funding from the Nippon Foundation, a group of fifteen experienced ocean
law scholars and officials prepared Guidelines for Navigation and
Overflight in the Exclusive Economic Zone in September 2005, after a
series of meetings discussing these issues.125  Among the Guidelines
adopted by this group was the following: “A coastal State may, in
accordance with international law, regulate navigation in its EEZ by ships
carrying inherently dangerous or noxious substances in their cargo.”126
This important statement provides further evidence that customary inter-
national law allows countries to regulate the movement of ships in waters
adjacent to their coasts based on the nature of the ship or its cargo. 
VI. CONCLUSION
Canada’s claim that the waters of the Bay of Fundy, which include
those of Head Harbor Passage, are the internal waters of Canada is
supported by the language and negotiating history of Article 10 of the Law
of the Sea Convention.  Canada’s claim is also supported by the principles
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127. Referring to the proposal in the 1970s for oil tankers to pass through Head Harbor
Passage, one author stated: “Given the navigational hazards in Head Harbor Passage, it is
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that govern claims to “historic waters.”  Thus, Canada has sovereign
authority over the waters of the Bay of Fundy and can regulate or restrict
passage through these waters, including Head Harbor Passage.  
Canada’s longstanding and well-founded claim that the waters of the
Bay of Fundy and of Head Harbor Passage are its internal waters provides
support for its action to regulate ships in this region.  Canada can also cite
to numerous examples of “state practice” taken by other nations, including
the United States, to support the view that customary international law
allows countries to restrict or regulate passage in coastal waters, including
the narrow and difficult Head Harbor Passage, for environmental and
security reasons to protect its coastal population and resources.127
